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Passwords are a good idea, in theory. They have the potential to act as a fairly strong gateway. In practice
though, passwords are plagued with problems. They are (1) easily shared, (2) trivial to observe and (3)
maddeningly elusive when forgotten. While alternatives to passwords have been proposed, none, as yet,
have been adopted widely. There seems to be a reluctance to switch from tried and tested passwords to novel
alternatives, even if the most glaring flaws of passwords can be mitigated. One argument is that there is not
enough investigation into the feasibility ofmany password alternatives. Graphical authenticationmechanisms
are a case in point. Therefore, in this paper, we detail the design of two prototype applications that utilise
graphical authentication mechanisms. However, when forced to consider the design of such prototypes, we
find that pertinent password problems eg. observation of entry, are just that: password problems.We conclude
that effective, alternative authentication mechanisms should target authentication scenarios rather than the
well-known problems of passwords. This is the only route to wide-spread adoption of alternatives.
authentication, shoulder-surfing, economics
1. INTRODUCTION
The problems surrounding passwords are not new:
they are the stuff of legend, as evident from the
following tale:
Two brothers lived in a small town. Cassim was
wealthy and wanted for nothing, Ali Baba was poor
and cut wood tirelessly to support his family. While
cutting wood in the forest one day, Ali Baba spotted a
flock of fierce men on horses heading his way and so
hid in a nearby tree. The leader walked right-up to the
tree and uttered a simple, secret word. A huge rock
rolled-back to reveal a vast cave, covered in treasure.
Stunned and shaken, Ali Baba stayed silent in the
tree as the men entered the cave and the rock rolled
shut. The men eventually left, at which point Ali Baba
leaped from the tree and spoke the simple, secret
word. The rock rolled-back and Ali Baba grabbed as
much treasure as he could and ran back to his family.
Cassim, shocked by Ali Baba’s sudden wealth,
demanded answers. Ali Baba recounted the story
and agreed with his brother to return in the morning.
Cassim, always the greedier, set out earlier. Once
at the cave, Cassim spoke the simple, secret word
and, to his amazement, the rock rolled-back. Cassim
entered and the rock rolled shut, he began grabbing
as much treasure as possible. However, when
Cassim wanted to leave, he could not recall the
simple, secret word. He tried in vain to remember,
spouting word after word.
The flock of thieves returned to the cave to deposit
more treasure. The leader spoke the simple, secret
word. The rock rolled-back to reveal Cassim cowering
in the corner of the cave. Cassim never left.
The tale of Ali Baba and Cassim is more commonly
known as Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves from 1001
Arabian Nights.
Some lessons emerge from this narrative:
• The first paragraph illustrates that passwords
are not resistant to surveillance. Ali Baba, after
all, was able to enter the cave because he was
eavesdropping. The problem still persists today,
as attackers can easily observe individuals
entering their passwords by shoulder-surfing.
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Passwords need to be resistant to eavesdrop-
ping and observation, otherwise their strength
is weakened. A password is an authentication
secret, it needs to be kept private and safe.
• The second paragraph showcases the authen-
tication secret being shared with others. Ali
Baba is able to communicate the password to
his brother and, as a result, Cassim was also
able to access the cave. Passwords should be
known only to the individual accessing the cave,
no-one else. Otherwise, it weakens the strength
of the password as it is no longer a secret.
• The third paragraph demonstrates that pass-
words are not memorable. Cassim’s life literally
depended on his remembering the password
that Ali Baba shared with him. A good pass-
word is a lengthy string of gibberish with no
meaning. The lack of meaning is what makes
such passwords difficult to remember. If a user
does not write it down, they will almost cer-
tainly reuse it. While a memorable password
has meaning, it also makes it predictable as it
has some structure or pattern. Making it eas-
ily compromised through brute-force or social-
engineering attacks.
• The final paragraph exemplifies the fact that
users and organisations only know when the
attacker is unsuccessful. When the leader of
the thieves rolls back the rock, he is confronted
with Cassim. The authentication secret has
been compromised, the password is pointless.
In modern-day electronic systems there is
often no way to detect that an attacker has
successfully used another person’s password.
These problems have always plagued passwords,
even when they were first deployed on the
Compatible Time Sharing System (CTSS) in 1962
(Corbató et al., 1962). The key difference between
then and now is that CTSS was aimed at
scientists and engineers. The password pitfalls
could be combatted with training and education.
Passwords are undeniably powerful, if used properly.
Organisations can craft secure locations, make
surveillance difficult, and use security policies and
training to mitigate the aforementioned problems.
The real problem is everyday users, managing an
increasing number of passwords to achieve more
and more tasks. Popular products like the Nintendo
Wii and Apple iPhone have pushed passwords
into untrained hands and spaces, never initially
envisioned or planned for.
What is needed is a password for plebs. Such
an authentication approach would be tailored
to the needs of the average user of popular
consumer products such as the Nintendo Wii and
Apple iPhone. Such an approach should tackle
the problems of observation, memorability and
sharing of authentication secrets. This authentication
approach would be targeted at consumers and
popular products rather than professionals and
tele-type terminals. The approach we proposed
was a graphical authentication mechanism called
Tetrad (Renaud & Maguire, 2009). This mechanism
utilised an image-based authentication secret that
users could enter in a way that was resilient to
surveillance. Tetrad appeared to solve a number
of the problems of passwords: the images were
memorable, observation of entry had the potential
to not leak the authentication secret and it is
cumbersome to note-down a picture password. We
thought we had found a viable alternative.
The initial prototype we constructed of Tetrad showed
promise. Unfortunately, Tetrad, like many other
graphical authentication mechanisms, has yet to be
adopted by any commercial product. Plebs still use
passwords and those passwords still suffer from the
age-old problems. For example, the NintendoWii and
Apple iPhone have yet to make any changes to their
authentication approach. In particular, neither have
bothered to tackle the problem of shoulder-surfing
even though both rely on an on-screen keyboard
for password entry, easily observable if users enter
their passwords in full view of onlookers. This makes
observation trivial and the authentication secret
public. Is this evidence of negligence or wisdom?
Here we will explain that it is actually a perfectly
justified decision.
Dunphy et al. argues the reason for slow uptake
in graphical authentication approaches, like Tetrad,
is due to designers and researchers not tackling
practical issues such as deployment (2010). This is
certainly true of the initial incarnation of Tetrad. The
initial implementation comprised only the mechanism
itself; there was no registration process and it
served no authentication purpose. Since it was not
protecting any application it could be argued that
the evaluation we carried out to prove its efficacy
was unrealistic. The implementation did not target an
actual platform but rather a mythical Apple television
context of use. Furthermore, themechanism relied on
a stock collection of celebrity faces. Personal images
were avoided because initialising or ‘bootstrapping’ a
graphical authentication with them is hard. Personal
images need to be collected from the user as well as
prepared and processed. The use of celebrity faces
simplified the situation, as they are readily available,
but such images suffer from predictability issues,
so the choice was less than optimal. These prickly
deployment issues were neatly avoided in our early
prototype.
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In this paper we discuss the prototyping of two
versions of Tetrad. We will refer to them as Jack
and Jill. Both versions rely on personal images
from Facebook. We will discuss deployment choices
related to image bootstrapping procedure and the
choice of application both mechanisms were bundled
with. We will outline the authentication scenario
and explain how the mechanism interacted with the
application.
The following section presents related research,
regarding the problems of passwords and the
concerns of observability of graphical authentication
secrets. The next section outlines the design of the
application, followed by a section detailing the image-
bootstrapping procedure for both versions of Tetrad.
Finally, we discuss the problems we encountered in
image-bootstrapping and address the relevancy of
obfuscation in graphical authentication. The paper
concludes that shoulder-surfing may well be a non-
issue in authentication design.
2. RELATED RESEARCH
There are many problems with passwords. Good
passwords are system-generated lengthy strings of
gibberishwith nomeaning. However, such passwords
are difficult for a user to manage in the short-term,
never-mind store long-term. Users, therefore, adopt
coping mechanisms (Chiasson et al., 2009), such as
writing passwords down or reusing them, to avoid
inconvenience. User-generated passwords are an
alternative option but people are ‘lazy’ and often
create short and memorable authentication secrets
(Riddle et al., 1989). Memorable passwords have
meaning, i.e. pattern and structure, that brute-force
and social-engineering attacks can easily exploit.
One solution to all these problems is an alternative
authentication approach, e.g. graphical passwords.
Graphical passwords are based on images rather
than characters. Humans use a dual-coding ap-
proach to process verbal and visual stimuli, gen-
erating analogue codes for visual information and
symbolic codes for verbal (Paivio, 1990). This ap-
proach results in images having superior recognition
for the words that name them (Nelson et al., 1976).
Individuals are also good at recognised previously
encountered images, even in pairs containing a dis-
tractor (Shepard, 1967).
A concern with graphical passwords is the predi-
cability of passwords created by users. Users are
influenced by elements such as attraction, race and
gender when selecting faces. Therefore, an attacker
can potentially identify likely images that form part
of a user’s authentication secret by simply knowing
something about the user. This makes sourcing im-
ages or bootstrapping a mechanism with images,
difficult, as some collection of images may not be
suitable. Celebrity images for example, a male user
may select attractive female users around his age.
The pool of images would be nearly the same for
every similar user, making it easy for an attacker
to identify a likely password. Graphical passwords
based on personal images have strong memorabil-
ity (Tullis & Tedesco, 2005) and may be alternative
solution, as they would be tailored to the user.
Furthermore, social network services have made
accessing and using such personal images much
easier. Therefore, we decided to construct Tetrad
prototypes that used images of faces, extracted from
personal images, sourced from Facebook.
3. APPLICATION DESIGN
The first step in the design of the application was to
define an authentication scenario. The envisioned
scenario for the prototype was a digital content store.
Purchasing a movie in front of friends and family is
a familiar authentication scenario for many. Users
peruse the catalogue, pick a product and then enter a
password to purchase it. Current consumer products
expect users to enter their password using an on-
screen keyboard, essentially exposing it to onlookers.
This burdens the user with the decision of either
sacrificing their authentication secret to maintain
good vibrations or being the paranoid android that
demands everyone exits the room.
Tetrad is designed to tackle this scenario, allowing
an individual to authenticate without worrying about
onlookers. The mechanism presents 45 images
within a grid and asks users to position four
secret images so that they align either horizontally,
vertically or diagonally. Interaction does not involve
moving individual images but manipulating rows and
columns of them, resulting in entry being resilient to
observation from onlookers.
While numerous scenarios were considered, includ-
ing a password manager and location tracker, the
conclusion was to continue with the original one, a
digital content store. A digital content store is a natural
fit for Tetrad as both heavily depend on screens.
Digital stores rely on high-quality screens that are
spacious enough for a user to peruse a product
catalogue and splendid enough to showcase content.
Tetrad, equally, relies on screens with enough space
and quality to showcase images.
The alternative scenarios were seriously considered
but ultimately rejected. Deploying a password
manager or location tracker, for example, puts the
user at risk. The application will, inevitably, contain
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bugs and flaws. When it fails, and it will, the user’s
passwords and locations would be exposed, an
unacceptable risk. A digital store puts content at risk,
not the user, a preferable scenario for evaluation.
Therefore, the resulting application was a digital
content store and accompanying media player,
designed for the iPhone. Tetrad was implemented
in Objective-C and originally only targeted Mac OS
X. The implementation made extensive use of key
frameworks, such as Core Animation, and users
interacted with it using an Apple Remote Control.
The prototype was designed for use on a television
and was aimed at tackling the aforementioned
authentication scenario.
Translating the implementation to the iPhone required
additional effort but was aided by the fact that the
iPhone’s operating system is essentially Mac OS
X. Interaction had to be re-thought as the remote
control was no longer relevant. Remote control events
thus became multi-touch gestures. Users swipe up,
down, left and right on a particular row or column to
reposition images. A double-tap gesture submits an
authentication attempt.
The second step in the design process was to define
the consequences of authentication. Users need
to understand the actions that follow authentication.
Screen real-estate is a premium on smartphones,
making text descriptions and instructions a luxury.
Consistent interaction should ensure that the
mere presentation of the authentication mechanism
communicates what actions follow. Sky serve as a
bad example, using a single PIN for (1) accessing
age-rated content and for (2) purchasing premium
content. Sky would argue the purpose is the same
in both cases, confirming the user is the bill-
payer. However, PIN entry actually has two possible
consequences, leading to ambiguity and confusion.
Users may accidentally purchase premium content
while assuming they are accessing age-rated
subscription content.
The consequences of authentication in the applica-
tion had to be clear. Tetradwas coupledwith a content
store, consequences were therefore limited to either
(1) payment or (2) access. The first approach is the
one adopted by iTunes while the second is akin to
Spotfiy and Netflix.
The latter approach was favoured, as the application
comprised of a digital store and media-player. Pur-
chased content would be kept within the application
and individuals would use the application’s media-
player to consume content. Tetrad regulated access
to application usage.
This design was used for both prototypes. What sep-
arated the prototypes was the image-bootstrapping
procedure used.
4. IMAGE BOOTSTRAPPING
Personal images were sourced from Facebook.
The first step in both prototypes required users to
connect their Facebook account with Tetrad and grant
permission for the mechanism to access personal
images of friends.
4.1. Jack — Face Recognition
The first challenge for the Jack prototype was to
analyse the images. The iPhone operating system, at
the time, did not provide support for detecting faces
within images. The Open Source Computer Vision
Library or OpenCV was used to process personal
images on the iPhone. The cross-platform library has
a vibrant community, providing documentation and
support for any number of generic image processing
algorithms, including detecting faces within images.
The library was bundled with the application. Once
the user had connected Tetrad with Facebook, the
mechanism submitted a query to the social network
for the user’s friend list. The response to the query
was used to download the profile picture of all the
user’s friends. The image processing procedure was
multi-threaded in an attempt to reduce the time taken
to process the images. The application spawned
multiple threads at once. An individual thread, dealt
with a single friend. The thread downloaded a friend’s
profile picture, analysed it for faces, returned an array
of possible faces and extracted a single face from the
image and stored it on the device. The process did not
recognise faces, i.e. the face detected in the profile
picture, is not necessarily of the profile owner.
The process simply selected the first element in
the array and used the coordinate information to
locate the face within the image and extract it.
The thread completed by adding an entry to list,
the entry included the friend’s name and the face
extracted. The instructions requested users to select
45 friends. The table-view remained responsive while
image-processing was happening. Therefore, users
did not need to wait until all personal images were
processed, they could select 45 images quickly and
move-on.
The next-step requested users to select 4 of the
45 images, as their authentication secret. The user
simply scrolled through a table-view of the 45 images
and tapped the entries they wanted to make their
authentication secret. The final step was to order the
sequence of the 4 images. Users were instructed
to memorise the extracted images and sequences.
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Once the user was content with the sequence, they
could complete registration.
4.2. Jill — Tags
The second prototype took a different direction to
image-bootstrapping, favouring a less computational
expensive approach. Instead of downloading and
analysing images to detect faces, the mechanism
relied on ‘tags’. Tags are used to identify friendswithin
images on Facebook. The social network service
provides a tagging tool, affording users the ability to
drag a box around a friend’s face within an image.
Users can then easily see all the photographs that
include a specific friend.
The Jill prototype utilised these tags, rather than
attempting to analyse and detect faces itself. The
registration process was compressed into a single-
stage. The aim was to make the registration process
feel zippier and more responsive, than earlier
versions.
The user’s friend-list was presented in table view,
with a table entry including the friend’s name and
profile picture. Users were instructed to select 45
friends, with 4 of themmaking-up their authentication
secret. All a user had to do was simply tap a table-
entry to select a friend. When a friend was selected,
users had the option to add that friend to their
authentication secret. They also had the option to
order the sequence of their authentication secret, at
the same time.When the user had selected 45 friends
and made 4 of them their authentication secret - a
button was enabled that allowed them to complete
the registration process.
5. DISCUSSION
Designing and developing prototypes of Tetrad that
relied on personal images only served to emphasise
the difficulty in deploying the mechanism in the real
world. The initial incarnation of the authentication
approach may have showed promise but the viability
of both prototypes is questionable.
The authentication approach relied on faces. The
prototypes extracted these faces from personal
images, sourced from Facebook. Putting aside the
actual usability of either prototype and merely
focusing on the practicality, neither seemed worthy of
further investigation. Bootstrapping either prototype
with images was incredibly expensive in terms of
time and resources, especially so when contrasted
with the tried and tested, as well as convenient,
alphanumeric approach.
The prototypes extracted and used faces in different
ways. The first prototype, titled ‘Jack’, actually
detected faces within personal images and extracted
them while the second prototype, titled ‘Jill’, used
user-generated tags from Facebook to extract faces
from personal images.
The image-bootstrapping procedure for Jack was
incredibly expensive as images had to be analysed to
extract faces. This consumed significant resources on
the user’s device and took some time. Alternatively,
image processing of personal images could have
occurred in the cloud instead of on the device. The
cloud option is desirable as image processing and
analysis is an intensive task. Amazon can provide
powerful cloud computing instances that allow for
multi-threaded image processing operations. The
cloud computing instance could locate and extract
faces within a few seconds, contrasted with several
minutes on a mobile device. The extracted faces
could be downloaded directly to the device and the
instance could be discarded. The main concerns
with the cloud computing approach is the bottleneck
in downloading images, the cost associated with
the operation and the privacy risk to the user.
These concerns led us to favour the second option,
processing the personal images on the user’s device.
Meanwhile, the second prototype, Jill, avoided
costly computation by using tags from Facebook to
extract faces. Although the prototype avoids costly
computation it still requires a complex registration
process. The user needs to spend time selecting
images for use within the mechanism and they have
to wait for those images to download. Contrast this
with alphanumeric authentication, where a user can
quickly tap out a text password in a few seconds.
The biggest mistake security researchers can make
is assuming that user effort were free (Herely, 2009).
The benefit of shielding an authentication secret,
for example, must not come at an exhorbitant cost.
Therefore, the real question becomes: How big a
threat is shoulder-surfing? The threat needs to be
fairly big to be worth the hassle of dealing with
Tetrad, instead of alphanumerics. The prototypes
forced thought on deployment issues, such as how
the mechanism would be bootstrapped with personal
images and what sort of application it would protect.
The original scenario we envisioned was a user
purchasing a movie in front of friends and family. The
reality, however, is that most users do not care if these
people know the password they use to purchase
movies. Users want to share a movie in their living
room, a far more valuable and intimate thing than
a password. If a friend or family member does use
someone’s else password, then they will work it out.
The same way they would, for example, if someone
took the last beer or slice of pizza. Shoulder-surfing
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in this context is a non-issue, something we failed to
recognise.
Therefore, for the prototypes we envisioned the
scenario of an individual accessing a digital store,
being exposed to the wider world. For example,
Ppurchasing a movie on a smartphone while having
a coffee at Starbucks or waiting for train in a station.
These places are bursting with strangers and a user
would not want any of them to observe entry of their
password. However, users are likely to authenticate
on a 4" inch screen, not a 40" one. Therefore, they
can position themselves and the screen to prevent
observation.
Lets say a stranger does, somehow, manage to
observe the password being entered in such a space.
What are the actual consequences, in the case of a
digital store? If an attacker does manage to purchase
several items from a service, such as iTunes, Apple
can de-activate the purchases.
Therefore, maybe the focus on digital stores was
the wrong scenario. Tetrad could have been used
to protect email or a financial service. However, no
individual would check their personal email account
or personal finance account on a television in front
of friends and family. Not necessarily because the
information is sensitive but because it is boring and
uninteresting. Large screens are for sharing and
although some users might want to read email and
check balances on a big-screen, they would wait until
the television is free, rather than interrupting a movie.
Constructing prototypes that are meant to be the
manifestation of a practical, deployable product
require us to focus on the actual application used,
the people using it and the places where it will be
used. Authentication is a package, it is not something
that is spooned on top of a finished product, it is part
of the product. The time and energy taken to create
a Tetrad secret is not necessary worth the hassle
because shoulder-surfing is not really something to
be concerned about in many contexts.
In the end we didn’t actually tackle an authentication
problem; we tackled a password problem. Tetrad
was not designed thinking about the users and the
tasks they wanted to complete but in order to right
the wrongs of passwords. Tetrad was burdened with
the legacy of the password approach. The design
process did not start with: people want to buy movies
in the living room. Instead it started with: these are
the problems with passwords in the living room.
6. CONCLUSION
You only live twice, or so it seems.
One life for yourself and one for your dreams.
You drift through the years and life seems tame
Till one dream appears and love is its name
Sung by Nancy Sinatra, the lyrics above are from
the John Barry classic, ‘You only live twice’. They are
inspired by the film and novel of the same name and
the lyrics speak to the idea that an individual ‘lives
twice’. The life they led and the life they lead after
facing death.
We thought we were testing Tetrad. The surprising
result of the evaluation was that shielding authenti-
cation secrets from surveillance, in many contexts, is
misguided at best and pointless at worst.
The route to wide-spread adoption of authentication
alternatives is though solving an authentication
scenario. Authentication is a package. The design
process should start by considering every aspect of
that package: people, places and purpose. Solving
the problems of passwords doth not a successful
authentication mechanism make.
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